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Abstract— In this article, a review of the most used 
approaches for the formal analysis of distributed systems 
cryptographic protocols and software tools implemented on the 
basis of these approaches has been done. The article examines 
such approaches as model checking, theorem proving, and 
believe logic, provides a list of well-known tools for automating 
the analysis of cryptographic protocols within each approach. On 
the basis of the conducted research, it was concluded that there is 
no universal tool for verifying the security of distributed 
information and computing systems authorization and 
authentication protocols. 
Keywords: formal verification; authorization; authentication; 
model checking; logical inference. 
INTRODUCTION 
The annual information security report Cisco for 2017 
marked a rapid increase of distributed information and 
computing systems usage. These systems are using 
modifications of open authentication and authorization 
protocols, the most common of which are OAuth 2.0 and 
OpenID Connect [1]. Given this fact and the steady trend 
towards the distributed information and computing systems 
usage [2], the tool for automated protocol security analysis 
is needed for developers. 
Currently, to assess the correctness and security of 
protocol, there are several basic formal approaches on the 
basis of which are implemented software tools. However, 
there remains an open question about the applicability of 
these solutions for analyzing the security of open 
authentication and authorization protocols, and especially 
their modifications used in cloud and distributed information 
and computing systems [3-4]. 
This article presents a study of current approaches for the 
formal analysis of cryptographic protocols, software tools 
implemented on the basis of these approaches, and analyzes 
the applicability of these solutions for analyzing the 
correctness and security of open authentication and 
authorization protocols. 
TASK ASSESMENT 
The most used approaches for verification of protocols 
are: model verification and logical inference, including 
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theorem proving and believe logic. On the basis of these 
approaches, software tools for automating protocol analysis, 
as described in [5], have been implemented. These solutions 
are based on one or several of the listed approaches, as a 
result, each of these software tools has its own specialized 
application field. This causes the logical problem of 
determining the optimal method for the formal analysis of 
the open authentication and authorization protocols 
correctness and security. 
As part of this work, existing approaches for formal 
verification of protocols, software tools based on the 
application of these approaches are investigated, and the 
applicability of these solutions for assessing the correctness 
and security of authentication and authorization open 
protocols of distributed systems are examined. 
I. PROTOCOL SECURITY LEVEL 
DETERMINATION 
Protocol - description of a distributed algorithm, in the 
process of which two participants (or more) consistently 
perform certain actions and exchange messages. Protocol 
security is expressed in providing guarantees for the 
implementation of such properties that characterize security, 
such as availability, confidentiality, integrity, etc. [5]. 
The rapid increase of cloud applications integration by 
employees into distributed networks of organizations [1] 
negatively affects the vulnerability of distributed systems, 
and therefore the verification of authentication and 
authorization protocols for users of distributed systems 
becomes one of the most important aspects of secure 
operation. 
The security level of a protocol is usually determined by 
simulating its operation and simulating malicious attacks. In 
this article, such approaches to protocol verification as 
«Model checking» and «Logical Inference» will be 
considered, as well as software tools that allow automating 
the protocols security verification, based on these 
approaches. The principal difference of these approaches is 
that the application of the «model checking» approach gives 
the greatest effect in a case when the model does not satisfy 
the set requirements, while the application of the «logical 
inference» approach is most effective for justifying the 
model's compliance with the set requirements. And since it 
is not known in advance whether the protocol meets the set 
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simultaneously to obtain the most correct assessment. 
It should be noted that in addition to checking the correct 
functioning of distributed systems, protocol verification 
includes determining the level of information security 
special properties. The most important of these are: 
1. Confidentiality – transmitted information is not 
available for unauthorized access. 
2. Integrity – a guarantee of providing genuine and 
complete information to an authorized user. 
3. Accessibility – ensuring quick access to information 
and resources for an authorized user. 
4. Authentication – user authentication at login. 
5. Authorization – verification of user access rights to 
information and system resources. 
Application of modeling approach to the verification of 
authentication and authorization protocols for distributed 
systems has several undeniable advantages: 
1. The convenience of use – simulation usage for 
protocols verification allows assessing the security 
level of a protocol without disrupting the operation of 
the system. 
2. Model variability – the developer determines the 
model, not including in it the features of the simulated 
system that are not essential for testing this condition. 
3. The possibility of further changes and debugging – 
depending on the approach used, as a result of the test, 
the developer receives a report on the model 
compliance with the requirements set, which helps to 
detect the inaccuracy of the constructed model or 
conditions imposed on it. 
Also worth noting is the possibility of complicating the 
system model with the gradual addition of new states and 
rules to it, which will make the model closer to the original 
and allows to detect the bottlenecks and the moments of 
their occurrence [6]. 
Disadvantages of the simulation approach: 
1. The complexity of the process – the model developer 
must highlight the necessary components of the 
simulated system to match the real system model. 
2. The complexity of the formal presentation – the model 
developer must formalize its representation in terms of 
the selected verification tool logic. 
3. The complexity of requirements formulation – the 
model developer must correctly and exhaustively 
formulate the requirements for the modeled system. 
Despite these shortcomings, modeling is a modern and 
effective method for verifying protocols, and various 
approaches to models formalization and verification allow 
obtaining the most correct assessment result [7]. 
1.1 Protocol security level determination in a distributed 
system 
As an example of a distributed system using 
modifications of open authentication and authorization 
protocols, was selected an architecture, which was registered 
by the authors in the patent for invention RU №266664 [8]. 
The main idea of this system is to realize the horizontal 
integration of information and computing resources without 
changing their structure, as well as increasing the reliability 
and security of information from unauthorized access. A 









Fig. 1 – A simplified architecture of distributed system 
The main components are: 
− Multiple client PCs (component 1) located in the global 
network; 
− Secure virtual environment including: 
− Central hub (component 2); 
− Multiple access nodes (component 3); 
− One or more backup central hubs (component 4); 
− Distributed information and computing resources 
(component 5), presented in the form of corporate 
portals.  
Authentication and authorization of users is performed 
using a modified version of OAuth 2.0 open protocol, so the 
task of the security and correctness formal verification of 
this protocol version arises. 
To determine the feasibility of practical implementation 
of the development, it is required to build its formal model, 
and to analyze its correctness and safety. However, at this 
stage, the main difficulty is the representation of the system 
within the formalisms of the chosen logic. Within 
distributed systems, this process is most difficult due to the 
complexity of their work. 
This article will observe the main approaches to the 
organization of the formal security analysis process of 
authentication and authorization protocols. 
II. MODEL CHECKING APPROACH 
The basic idea of this approach is to build a behavioral 
model of a system with a finite number of conditions and 
requirements (properties), subject to verification within the 
model states. 
As a rule, only the main properties of the system are taken 
in the construction, that affect the test result, thereby 
achieving a reduction of the model size and an acceleration 
of the verification process. In this case, the model can be 
specified both explicitly – by enumerating all the vertices 
and edges of the model state graph, or implicitly – by 
boolean functions representing the transition relation and the 
set of initial states. 
Model checking algorithms are based on a full view of the 
model state space: for each state, it is checked whether it 
meets the stated requirements. The algorithms are 
guaranteed to be completed, since the model is finite [9]. 
The verification method based on model checking uses the 
system representation as a set of states. In this case, a subset 
of states with any violated safety criterion is highlighted. 
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such a set in this model is empty, otherwise the system does 
not fall into any of the sets. 
The main software tools implemented on the «Model 
checking» approach basis are listed in Table 1. 
III. RESULTS & DISCUSSIONS 
 
Table 1 – Software tools implemented on the «Model 












Scyther Python/C Combined 
approach 
Yes 
ProVerif OCaml Combined 
approach 
Yes 
Casper CSP Model 
checking 
Yes 
SPIN C/LTL Model 
checking 
No 
FDR2 CSP Model 
checking 
No 
PRISM Java Model 
checking 
No 






The result of applying the «Model checking» approach is 
a message about successful verification when the model 
complies with the requirements set, or a sequence of model 
actions during which non-compliance with the conditions 
occurs. If a discrepancy is reached as a result of model 
checking, a verdict of the model incorrectness or the formal 
requirements incorrectness is made [10]. 
IV. LOGICAL INFERENCE APPROARCH 
In general, the logical inference is a deductive approach 
to the construction and formal substantiation of assertions 
(invariants). Requirements for invariants: 
1. Each invariant is true at the system start time. 
2. After each step of the system, each invariant preserves 
the truth. 
3. System specification is a conjunction of invariants. 
Verification method based on logical inference consists of 
formalizing verifiable protocol, the actions of the attacker 
and the protocol security criteria as statements in terms of 
chosen formal logic. Next step is the protocol checking for 
compliance with the criteria set, possibly using automated 
tools [11]. 
When applying the logical inference method for analyzing 
cryptographic protocols, there are distinguished means 
based on the approach of theorem proving and believe logic. 
 
3.1 Theorem proving approach 
This approach represents a software implementation of a 
tool for proving statements based on propositional logic and 
predicate logic. The approach basis is to use the 
mathematical logic apparatus for the implementation of the 
final software tool [12].The advantage of this approach is 
the rigor and commonality of logic, reducible to the solving 
tasks automation. An obvious disadvantage, logically arising 
from the rigor of logic, is the need to formalize the 
statements in the predicates given by the software 
implementation. The main software tools implemented with 
the «Theorem proving» approach are given in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 – Main software tools implemented with the 












Coq  OCaml Theorem 
proving 
No 
Isabelle Standard ML Combined 
approach 
Yes 
HOL  Light OCaml Theorem 
proving 
No 
Nuprl  CLisp Theorem 
proving 
No 
















3.2 Believe logic approach  
This approach involves the formal rules set usage to 
determine the veracity (trust) of an assertion. There are such 
implementations of specialized assertion analysis tools, such 
as GNY, SvO, etc. based on this approach. One of the most 
variable tools based on "believe logic" approach, that allows 
for a formal analysis of authentication and authorization 
protocols correctness is BAN logic. 
The Barrows-Abadi-Needham logic or BAN logic is a 
formal logic model for analyzing knowledge and trust [13]. 
This logic is solvable, so there is an algorithm that checks 
the correctness of the conclusions made from the 
hypotheses. 
This model is a set of structures, or a logical language, 
and a set of axioms and rules applicable to these structures. 
The authors of the BAN logic identified the basic constructs 
for four actions: believing, controlling, seeing and saying 
messages [14]. These constructs constitute a language for 
describing the trust between the components of the network 
during the protocol operation. The rules and axioms of BAN 
logic allow the derivation of new trusted statements from 
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Currently, there are implemented solutions for the formal 
analysis of authentication and authorization protocols, each 
is distinguished by the approach, verification methodology 
and scope. As a result of the review, it was revealed that the 
most problematic part of the protocol analysis is the correct 
and adequate formalization of the modeled system in terms 
of the chosen logic. This problem is inherent in any 
approach since the developer is required to build a correct 
and adequate model of the source system. And in the 
conditions of rapid count growth of cloud applications with 
modified open authentication and authorization protocols, to 
simplify the task of analyzing the security of a distributed 
system, an urgent task is to apply the automated tools for 
analyzing protocols. 
Also, as a result of the review, it was revealed that each 
approach to protocol verification has its own characteristics, 
and there is no universal tool for assessing the security of 
authentication and authorization protocols. And to obtain the 
most adequate protocol security assessment usage of a 
combined approach is required. Combined approach allows 
compensating the shortcomings of one verification tool at 
the merits expense of another. 
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